This paper provides a generalized model concerning the one-shot pure-strategy moral hazard contracting game with the inclusion of observable actions as well as unobservable actions. Primarily, we propose conditions under which the solution to such a principal-agent problem exists. The outcome/action/reward spaces are assumed to be all metrizable and compact. We allow them to be uncountable and multi-dimensional. Moreover, the space of feasible contracts may take the form of Caratheodory functions and is nontrivial. We do not need any other a priori technical assumptions on the contract function space. We also present the justi…cation of the inclusion of observable actions as contingencies in contracts in views of the in ‡uence of existing observable actions on the welfare of two parties. Including observable actions along with the outcomes in the contract can reinforce the incentive of outcome-contingent contracts and curb the agent's opportunist tendency. Nevertheless, monitoring cost as a kind of transaction cost will be also a determinant of the incentive for the principal to include observable actions in contracts.
Introduction

Background and Motivation
A classic topic in economics is time-rate payment system versus piece-rate payment system. As Lazear(1986) states, time-rate payment "depends on an input measure", namely, the actions of workers, whereas piecerate payment is "directly related to output", namely, the outcomes of workers'production. Much evidence indicates that productivity in piece-rate …rms is higher than that in time-rate …rms. It is commonly argued that piece-rate pay is an incentive device whereas straight salary provides no incentives. As there exist quite a few critiques on piece-rate, in practice management experts have put forward a series of combination of time and piece work payment systems. Among them, the famous two are Gantt task and bonus system and Emerson's e¢ ciency system. They represent the payment systems based on both inputs and outputs by workers. This stylized fact suggests a more generic situation in real life: incentive contracts may include both some outcomes and some observable actions as contigencies in principal-agent problem with moral hazard, although traditional agency theory completely splits the contracts merely based on outcomes and those merely based on actions.
In practice, with the advance of complexity of actions and information technology, in addition to hidden actions, part of the agent's actions may turn out to be observable and veri…able in the process of delegation between the principal and the agent and straightly a¤ect the agent's welfare. Note that if both categories of actions exist the agent must take both of them in the delegation process. In most real-life circumstance, due to legal customs, social conventions, etc, the agent has discretion to select both observable actions and unobservable actions. Di¤erent from ex-post observable outcomes, those observable actions will also impact the principal-agent relationship somehow. The observable actions could either directly a¤ect the probability distribution of outcomes or contain partial information of hidden actions. It is natural for the principal to consider writing contracts based on observable actions as well as observable outcomes.
There are many relevant instances in the areas of management, accounting, …nance, insurance, etc. For sales managers, the business travels, including attending conferences, presses or meetings and the number of calls can be regarded as observable actions also and can be rewarded allowance in the contract; board members may get extra compensation by how many times they attend the routine meetings of the board of directors; more and more contracts have included training as an observable action of employees, especially some professional sport contracts. The owner may o¤er bonus to his professional player if the player participates in a conditioning program to keep his back/waist/knee healthy or lose weight. For life insurance contracts, a discount can be o¤ered if the insured take routine health examinations. Government transfer to a family with children, as a kind of contract, will based on both the welfare of each of their children (outcome) and the number of children the family has (observable actions).
The …rst natural questions will immediately come to be: can people still …nd an optimal contract with the inclusion of observable actions in the moral hazard problem? Fortunately, the answer to the …rst question is YES even under a series of very general conditions according to the analysis of this paper. Subsequently, since observable actions do exist in many cases and do a¤ect the welfare of both parties, is it valuable to add the observable actions as contigencies in contract design? Moreover, we know that piece-rate pay is an incentive device whereas time-rate pay generally provides few incentives. Then, is there any change in incentive providing if we attach observable actions to outcomes as contingencies in the contract? This paper will unravel the mystery behind these questions.
There is a proli…c literature concerning moral hazard model to examine how the optimal contracts as a scheme could reconcile the con ‡ict of interests of such two parties given hidden action of agent. Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) …rst address the moral hazard problem on insurance market. Sequentially, Ross(1973) , Mirrlees(1974) , Harris and Raviv(1979) , Shavell(1979) , Holmstrom(1979) and Grossman and Hart(1983) formulate the basic moral hazard model. Their research is based on the First-Order-Approach. It usually required very restricted setting/assumptions. Page(1987) …rst o¤ers a substantively more general moral hazard model than past research in the approach of mathematical programming based on topological structure instead of FOA and proved the existence of deterministic optimal contracts. Kadan, Reny and Swinkels (2011) relax the assumptions on contract space and prove the existence of optimal contracts in pure moral hazard model as an extreme case of optimal mechanisms.
In particular, Harris and Raviv(1979) , Shavell(1979) and Holmstrom(1979) start to examine the inclusion of the additional signals in the incentive contracts. Holmstrom (1979) also establishes criteria for when a state-contingent second-best contract can be improved by the conclusion of additional signals. The essence behind it is that the principal will always seek to usher in more available information in contracting to improve the contract structure and therefore raise welfare. Nevertheless, almost nobody has addressed the informative value of observable actions other than the additional signals. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) study the multitask(multiaction) principal-agent analysis. They accent that there can be many types of actions of the agent in delegation. Yet in their analysis the multi-actions are all assumed to be unobservable. Slightly realizing the mixture case of both observable actions an unobservable actions emerging in moral hazard model, Baker(1992) just mentions there could be the observable e¤ort case. He assumes that e¤ort is observable and therefore contractible. "Being able to observe e¤ort does expand the set of possible contracts that the principal can use....This contract pays the agent two separate piece rates, one for the "expected" level of the performance measure given her level of e¤ort and another for the di¤erence between this expected level and the actual value realized by the performance measure." However, he was only focusing on a very particular situation with linear contracts. Plus it is not realistic to assume that e¤ort is observable. Unfortunately, he did not generalize this situation or present an explicit formal model on that.
Therefore, this paper will further propose a general theoretical framework for numerous applications addressing new features in practice. The contract structures could be more meticulous in order to capture more features up to date. Particularly, our readers will see the inclusion of observable actions will greatly change the contract structure and bring to the principal more complication in contract design. Addressing those features will help people calibrate the design of contracts in practice. Moreover, contracts can be viewed as a device to cope with the agent's opportunism. The inclusion of observable actions in contracts will enhance the e¤ect of such a device. Thus, we are attempting to re-formulate this situation with the consideration of observable actions and identify the general conditions for the existence of the related optimal contract to solve this principal-agent problem. Plus, we will examine the justi…cation for the inclusion of observable actions in contracts and corresponding incentive providing.
The results and contribution of the paper
The most signi…cant feature of this paper is to take into account observable actions in moral hazard model. Besides, there are two more features that have not been paid enough attention in most existing literature but have been very notable in practice nowadays. First, contract may assign more general rewards than one-dimensional monetary rewards. They could be not only monetary but also non-monetary, e.g. promotion, working environment, stock options, vacation, insurance, etc. Labor contracts are usually aimed at providing composition of pay package. Moreover, delegation return can be not only one-dimensional monetary return, e.g. manager's e¤ort can bring to …rm owner not only monetary revenue but also market share, reputation/brand e¤ect, consumer loyalty, premium in stock value, etc. Moreover, On the other hand, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) identi…ed the "metering" cost as a key determinant of whether decentralized incentives or centralized monitoring should be used. The metering cost can be thought of as monitoring cost in principal-agent problem, which was almost negligible in existing literature but was very practical in real life. The principal usually has to consider observation/monitoring cost in decision of contract design in practice. Such cost may be very signi…cant in real-life, since outcomes and observable actions could be very complex and diversi…ed. Townsend(1979) …rst systematically addressed the e¤ect of monitoring cost of the principal. Gale and Hellwig(1985) examined the situation in which there is the observation cost varied with the state. However, most papers concerning moral hazard often neglect the role of monitoring cost. This paper is attempting to take into account such observation/monitoring cost in decision of contract design.
This paper provides a generalized moral hazard problem in terms of mathematical programming, which is essentially an one-shot pure-strategy contracting game with the inclusion of observable actions. Taking a somewhat di¤erent assumption framework from the latest paper by Kadan, Reny and Swinkels (2011), this paper focuses on pure-strategy (deterministic) contracts instead of randomized contracts, since randomization appears to occurs less often in practice 1 . Similar as Kadan et al, this paper is generally based on topological approach instead of FOA to acquire the most generality. Moreover the outcome/action/reward spaces are only based on some general topological structure. All of them are metrizable and are allowed to uncountable and even in…nitely dimensional. We still require some technical assumptions about (sequential) compactness to prove the existence of optimal contract. Nevertheless, such assumptions are still reasonable in the economic sense 2 . Plus, the universal contract (as the principal's strategy) space whose element takes the form of Caratheodory function 3 , can be allowed to be in…nitely dimensional. It will be automatically sequentially compact in the topology of pointwise convergence, as long as the reward space is a compact metric space 4 . So is the feasible contract space as its sequentially closed subset. Hence we do not need any other a priori technical assumptions on the contract space to guarantee sequentially compactness, which is desirable for the existence of optimal contracts. We will additionally show by instances that the sequentially compact contract space is not trivial. 1 Arnott and Stiglitz(1988) discuss six reasons why randomization might not occur so frequently as they theoretically suggest in their paper. 2 One main reason is some realistic restrictions always indicates a certain "…niteness" in the spaces of economic variables. One can recall the primary concept of economics: scarcity, which embodies resource constraints in a society. 3 In fact, it can be relaxed to the set of Borel measurable functions which are continous in observable actions almost everywhere w.r.t outcomes. 4 This is a reasonable assumption corresponding to many real-life constraints. Note that compactness on metric spaces implies boundness. As Jewitt Kadan Swinkels (2008) point out, there are relevant upper and lower bounds on payments due to market or legal customs. For example, the agent may have limited liability and the principal will preserve residual claim.
Furthermore, two parties' preferences also take a general form rather than restricting attention to any particular functional form. Observation cost is integrated into the preferences as well, whereas it used to be neglected in the existing literature concerning the existence of optimal contracts. Di¤erent from this paper, Kadan et al (2011) release the restriction on the contract space by assuming the reward space is a Polish space 5 so that contracts are allowed to be unbounded. However as a tradeo¤ in ensuring the existence, Kadan et al have to impose a series of strict assumptions on the utility functions and the probabilitistic distribution of the outcomes. Yet this paper merely assumes the utility functions to be continuous and merely requires the parameterized probability measures to be continuous in the action parameters. There is no particular stochastic relationship between the agent's actions and the outcomes observed by the principal. Kadan et al also provide two results on when optimal contracts can be chosen to be deterministic, but the conditions for those two results are still strict and include some more a priori restrictions on endogenous deterministic contracts, which are not required in our model. We thereby deduces the sequential continuity of expected utility functions of both parties and the sequentially compactness of the constraint set. In that case one can nail down the existence of optimal deterministic contract-recommendation action, namely the solution to principal-agent problem. This paper can be regarded as a complement to Kadan et al's work. Note that the agent's observable actions do exist and in ‡uence the agent's utility. If it is costless to observe such actions, we will show the contracts based on both the outcomes and the observable actions always weakly dominate the contracts ignoring observable actions. In some case related to strategic complementarity, strong dominance can be satis…ed. In addition, although the outcome-contingent contract is viewed as an incentive device whereas the straight observable-action-contingent contract provides few incentives, including observable actions along with the outcomes in the contract can reinforce the incentive and curb the agent's opportunist tendency. As long as the monitoring cost allow, it is always desirable for the principal to include observable actions in contracts.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and basic ingredients used in the model and discuss several important assumptions. In Section 3, we prove the existence of optimal solution to the principal-agent problem. In Section 4, we will show the value of the inclusion of observable actions in the contracts. Concluding remarks will be given in section 5.
The model and Basic ingredients
We consider a one-shot sequential (Stackelberg) game of two representative players. One representative player is called the principal, the other representative one is called the agent. The principal calls for the agent's delegation of realizing an economic objective of his interest. There are three stages:
At Stage 1, the principal moves …rst and proposes an enforceable take-it-or-leave-it contract or incentive scheme to the agent based on observable/veri…able actions and outcomes. The principal may also suggest actions for the agent to take.
At stage 2, the agent moves second and decides to take or leave the contract …rst. Then if she 6 accepts it, she will perform some speci…ed service just as the principal desires, choosing the observable actions 5 Note that every compact metric space is a Polish space. 6 Throughout the paper, masculine pronouns refer to the principal, whereas feminine pronouns apply to the agent. and the unobservable actions in response to the contract 7 .
At stage 3, nature moves by means of stochastic causal relationship between actions and outcomes and it realizes the outcomes of the delegation. The principal will observe and acquire all the outcomes. He will reward agent according to the contract.
For instance, when the supervisor designs for the worker a compensation scheme as a combination of time-rate pay and piece-rate pay. The supervisor …rst proposes such a combination contract to the worker. Then the worker will take it or leave it. If he accepts the contract, he will decide the observable work time and unobservable e¤ort level. Then the stochastic production technology contingent on work time and e¤ort will generate some outcome, i.e. production output. Finally, the worker is rewarded according to the contract based on work time and output after she takes the actions recommended by the supervisor.
We will assume that the basic elements of the game are known to both the principal and the agent. We will use topological approach instead of variational approach to examine this problem so we will introduce a certain topological(metric) structure into our framework. To begin, we establish the following notation and assumptions.
Agent' s strategy
Agent has two categories of actions: observable action and unobservable action. Both of them will a¤ect the principal's interests/welfare as well as the agent's. However unobservable action, as agent's hidden action, is de…nitely not contractible. That is the root source of asymmetric information in moral hazard model. Since there is hidden action, both categories of actions cannot be directly speci…ed by principal in his interests.
A 0 denotes the set of the observable 8 actions a 0 0 s available to the agent at the beginning of the period. We will assume that the actions chosen by the agent at the beginning of the period are mutually observable by the principal and the agent. A 1 represents the set of all the possible unobservable actions a 0 1 s available to the agent at the beginning of the period. There is a certain correspondence relationship between observable actions and unobservable actions, which can be described in a set-valued function A u : A 0 A 1 : Just let A denote agent's action set. A is the graph of A u : Its element, namely agent's actual actions, is denoted by a = (a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 A A 0 A 1 : For any given a 0 ; unobservable action
Thus the model degenerates to the case with unobservable action only. Example 3 (In…nite-dimensional actions) In a production company, the manager needs to choose the production technology, which can be unobservable or observable to the owner of the company in practice.
Choosing the production technology can be modelized as choosing the production functions or cost functions. For instance, the feasible set of production functions can be a compact subset of L 1 (X; ) space.
X denotes the input space, a subset of R and denotes Lebesgue measure. The element of L 1 (X; ) is a (lebesgue) integrable real-valued function on X. Its values are outputs. In this case, such an action set is an in…nite-dimensional functional space and a subset of a Banach space as well.
Example 4 In many …nancial corporations, the fund manager will pick an investment portfolio policy, which is usually a stochastic process fa t g within a certain period before the contract will be renegotiated. fa t g can be viewed as the observable action. It may be picked on an in…nite-dimensional functional space.
Meanwhile the fund manager also has the e¤ ort level e to choose as his hidden action.
Example 5
In a simple case of technology transfer with moral hazard, the licensor will expect the licensee to employ relevant technology equipment within [0; a] or set up ad hoc technology transfer Lab/center within {yes, no}. Those are regarded as the licensee's observable actions. However, the licensee will also have unobservable e¤ orts within [0; e] to assimilate, adapt and improve the technology on the market that he faces.
Mother nature' s move
Mother nature representing uncertainty will stochastically generate the outcomes of delegation with the in ‡uence of the agent's actions. denotes the set of all possible end-of-period mutually observable outcomes ! 0 s, which is also veri…able by the third party. The outcomes may include not only monetary outcomes but also some nonmonetary signals. The observable outcomes may be also called performance measurements, information system or signals.
[Assumption A2] is a compact metric space. The principal may care about all the observable signals, since they all contain the relevant information about the agent's real contribution. The outcomes are speci…ed by the principal based on his monitoring capacity and/or legal customs. is the sample space or the space of mutually observable outcomes ! 0 s. If is a subset of Euclidean space, we can treat as a state space. 9 Discrete metric can ensure the compactness on it.
Remark 2 If is not a subset of Euclidean space, we may de…ne a random vector X as a B( ) measurable function X : ! R k : By doing so, we can convert sample points to real numbers. Thus, we can transfer the outcomes to more familiar case in the sense of random vector. However we do not require the closeness or compactness of the codomain or range of X:
Let B( ) denote the Borel -…eld in mutually observable outcome space . Thus, ( ; B( )) is a measurable space. For each action pair (a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 A, let p( ; a 0 ; a 1 ) : ! [0; 1] be a probability measure de…ned on ( ; B( )): Note that p( ; a 0 ; a 1 ) is a probability measure parameterized by (a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 A. Thus, ( ; B( ); p( ja 0 ; a 1 )) is a probability measure space.
Let
The set of parameterized probability measures P(A) represents the players' probability beliefs about the stochastic causal relationship between the actions and the outcomes. Thus, for example, if the agent chooses actions (a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 A, then in the agent's view, the observable outcomes will be generated according to the probability measure p( ja 0 ; a 1 ), which is uniform common knowledge between principal and agent 10 .
[Assumption A3] for each closed subset E of , p(E; ) : A ! [0; 1] is continuous on A; i:e:p(E; ; a 1 ) is continuous in a 0 and p(E; a 0 ; ) is continuous in a 1 ;that is, for each f(a 0;n ; a 1;n )g ! (a 0 ; a 1 ) in A; p(E; a 0;n ; a 1;n ) ! p(E; a 0 ; a 1 ):
can be represented by a density g(!; a 0 ; a 1 );which is nonnegative. The family of densities could be standard normal distributions. a 1 and 2 a0 ( 2 is some real constant) could be respectively the mean and variance of each normal distribution. 
Principal' s strategy
The principal's strategy is to provide to the agent a contract contingent on both the outcomes ! and the observable action a 0 2 A 0 : ! and a 0 are contractible, i.e. a 0 and ! becomes an argument of f then. Note that this contract is complete, i.e. f will assign a reward to each pair (!; a 0 ):In this case principal is not able to force agent to choose a certain level of observable actions a 0 ; i:e: the agent is entitled to choose a 0 in his interest as well as a 1 , as is an associated consequence of hidden actions.
D denotes the set of all possible end-of-period rewards d 0 s for agent, which is not necessarily monetary.
Reward is mutually observable by both the principal and the agent.
[Assumption A4] D is a nonempty compact metric space.
1 0 One can also assume heterogeneous beliefs of two parties. As Page (1987) presented, the principal and the agent may have two heterogeneous families of parameterized probability measures over ( ; B( )); P 0 (A) and P 1 (A):Usually, the principal knows that the agent's belief will belong to P 0 (A), whereas the agent does not know that the principal's belief will belong to P 1 (A): Our readers will easily see that this setting does not change our existence result at all as long as [A-3] is applicable to the belief of each one.
Example 10 Employment reward space
Example 11 The executive compensation schemes includes call options on the …rm's stock. The value of call option is usually model as a function V : S T ! R: S denotes the space of the strike price. T denotes time. The space of call options reward will be assumed to be a function space which can be metrizable and compact.
Let Example 12 Time-rate pay could be continuously piecewise linear with a cuto¤ point as overtime starting point.
K ( M) denotes the set of all feasible enforceable contracts given current market/technology conditions and legal customs and principal's ability of computation and accounting, which corresponds to bounded rationality.
[Assumption A5] M is equipped with the topology of pointwise convergence. K is a sequentially closed subset of M:
Remark 4 In mathematical sense, the contracts belong to the collection of the functions whose domain and codomain are both speci…ed to be compact sets. Every feasible enforceable compensation scheme is de…ned on a compact set of signals and observable actions. In our model, we only care about the functions whose image of such a compact domain can be contained in a compact reward set. Note that such a function can have the identical functional expression as the one that has a non-compact domain and a non-compact codomain. For instance, consider the linear functions de…ned on a compact interval of R and those de…ned on R with identical functional expression.
Remark 5 On a …nite action set or a …nite outcome set, any metric that can induce discrete topology can ensure the continuity and measurability of any function de…ned on the set, e.g., discrete metric for a binary set, or the metric induced by norm on a …nite subset of vector space, etc.
Players'payo¤
Under contract f 2 K, the agent receives payo¤ f (a 0 ; !). The principal can gain utility from ! and has to pay f (a 0 ; !) to agent.
u : D ! R is the principal's utility function over end-of-period outcomes and reward to agent. However, the principal has to burden the cost of using contract as an incentive device, namely, monitoring cost. Here monitoring cost c(a 0 ; !) is an aggregate cost depending on a 0 and ! (in the form of disutility). The agent can observe a 0 and ! freely. She can observe her a 0 for sure. Either she can observe it as soon as the state is realized or the principal will disclose the state he observes according to legal customs. The states and observable actions are veri…able by third party too.
c : A 0 ! [0; c] R is the monitoring cost function. The fact that c is …nite also implies the so-called "observability". r 2 R represents the agent's reservation payo¤. It is an exogenous variable and is observable to both parties.
v : D A ! R is the agent's utility function de…ned over end-of-period rewards and beginning-ofperiod actions.
Given contract f 2 K and action a 2 A, the principal's expected utility is
The agent's expected utility is
Remark 6 These two integrals always exist. Actually, the mapping ! 7 ! u(!; f (a 0 ; !)) c(a 0 ; !) is measurable and integrable on each ( ; B( ); p( ja 0 ; a 1 )). It is measurable simply because u and c are continuous and f is Borel measurable in !. It is integrable because for each (f; a; !); u is continuous on Z D which are compact and c is continuous on A 0 D which is compact. Hence the ranges of both are compact and therefore ! 7 ! u(!; f (a 0 ; !)) c(a 0 ; !) is bounded on R. Therefore, U (f; a 0 ; a 1 ) always exists. By similar argument, V (f; a 0 ; a 1 ) always exists too: ; where is a constant.
Game tree and the description of basic problem
Let us summarize the common knowledge as follows:
K; A; ( ; B( ); P(A)); u; r; v; c:
One should notice that a 0 and ! will be both observable and veri…able at the end of period. So they are likely to be contractible. The game tree describing this contracting problem can be drawn as below:
Each path from node P to the end node corresponds to an outcome path. Although this contracting game is an cooperative bargaining procedure in essence, since two parties can form a binding commitment, i.e. the contract, to a¤ect their payo¤s, one can still use noncooperative approach to obtain the solution to this particular bargaining game from the positive perspective. To look for optimal contract, we are actually seeking a pure-strategy Subgame Perfect Equilibrium(SPE) for this contracting game, i.e. an equilibrium path. In the subgame from node A, there could be multiple subgame equilibrium paths. So the solution, as a pure-strategy SPE, implies that principal will recommend an action in his best interests within those actions corresponding to subgame equilibrium paths. Simply put, the principal and agent have di¤erent and independent objective functions. It means the goals of two parties' con ‡ict. In the process of delegation, since the principal is not able to observe the agent's hidden (unobservable) actions which directly a¤ect the real contribution of the agent, the agent has opportunist tendency, i.e. she will always choose the actions in her own interests instead of the principal's, since the principal is not able to acquire complete information about the agent or control her actions. A standard principal-agent problem 1 ) The …rst constraint is participation constraint (PC). It mean that optimal contract must be under the consideration of guarantee the participation of agent. The second one is incentive compatibility constraint (IC). It means that optimal contract must be under the consideration of allowing agent to choose actions in her best response to a given contract. It also implies the agent's optimal problem in response to given contracts. In section 3, we will show that this problem has a solution, i.e. max In order to guarantee the optimal contract can be achieved in the presence of agent's participation, we should assume additionally The set-valued function A : K !A denotes the best response mapping of agent to proposed contract. We can rewrite the principal-agent problem in a compact way:
where Gr r A = f(f; a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 K A : f 2 K(r) and (a 0 Then one can use conventional FOA to solve this problem.
Existence of optimal contracts
The existence of optimal contract in our model is based on the most basic topological structure. We will show it step by step as below. We will suppose the assumptions A1-A7 hold for all the results throughout this section.
Re-examination on the contract set K
We will observe that the set M is sequentially compact for the topology of pointwise convergence. Here we are inspired by the discussion on the indexed contract sets in Page(1983) . That is important for the proof of existence of optimal contracts. Note that M is initially endowed with the property of sequential compactness and K inherits this property as a sequentially closed subset of M, which is not an a priori assumption on K.
Proposition 1 M is sequentially compact for the topology of pointwise convergence.
Proof. If the function set M can be indexed by I; M = fg( ; ; )j 2 Ig where the index set I is a metric space, and where the Caratheodory function g :
Let us take a step back, By theorem 1 and corollary 1.1. (Io¤e 1979) 
Therefore, it is easy to show that M is sequentially compact for the topology of pointwise convergence, since I is compact 11 .
In that case, with this topology K, as a (sequential) closed subset of M, will be also sequentially compact, that is, for any sequence ff n (a 0 ; !)g n of contracts in K there is a subsequence ff nk (a 0 ; !)g k and a contract f (a 0 ; !) 2 K such that f nk (a 0 ; !) ! f (a 0 ; !) for all (a 0 ; !) 2 A 0 . Meanwhile, it is obvious that K is uniformly bounded. (i.e., for all f 2 K, f (A 0 ; ) is bounded, since D is a compact metric space and therefore bounded.). The ranges of the contracts are bounded. It re ‡ects the limited nature of resources.
As for feasible contract set, market/technology conditions, legal customs, bounded rationality and so forth will de…nitely place a restriction on the reasonable contract set. There cannot be any arbitrary contract for the principal to pick. It is still reasonable to retain sequential compactness on K as a sequentially closed subset of M. In fact, there exists many examples of sequentially compact contract set. It indicates that sequentially compact contract set is not trivial.
Example 16 Equicontinuous contract sets. If K is equicontinuous in (a 0 ; !); then by Ascoli-Arzela Theorem (Royden 1988) , K is sequentially compact for the topology of pointwise convergence. Particularly, the set consisting of functions de…ned on a compact domain with derivatives bounded by the same constant is equicontinuous. For example, in real life, the loyalty usually cannot exceed 100%.
Example 17 Indexed contract sets. Suppose M is indexed by a compact index set I. Furthermore, suppose K is indexed by a closed subset I 0 of I such that K = fg( ; ; ) 2 M : 2 I 0 g, where the index set I 0 is also a compact metric space, and where the Caratheodory function g( ; ; ) is Borel-measurable in …rst two arguments and continuous in the third one. As shown before, K is sequentially compact. E.g. 1) Easy to get the extension of an example Page presented (Page 1983 ): generalized piecewise liner technology. Many contract sets consisting of the contracts piecewise linear in ! and linear in a 0 can be reformulated as indexed contract sets with compact index sets. 2) All sets consisting of convex combinations of …nitely many contracts can be viewed as indexed contract sets with compact index sets. In particular, De…ne := f(r; t; s) 2 R 3 + jr + s + t = 1g:View as a compact index set. Suppose we have three basic contracts f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 :Let K = frf 1 + sf 2 + tf 3 j(r; t; s) 2 g:Obviously, K is indexed by a compact set. Example 18 Composition contract sets. Let g : A 0 ! R be a Caratheodory scoring function; that is, a function assigning to each (a 0 ; !) a real number or score. Suppose now that each contract, f in K, has the form f = h g, where h : R ! D is a Borel measurable payo¤ function; that is, a function assigning to each score a payo¤ . Finally, suppose that the scoring function g is …xed, and that the principal chooses a contract by choosing a payo¤ function h from a set C of D-bounded, Borel measurable functions de…ned on R. If C is sequentially compact, then K is also sequentially compact. E.g. 1) Payo¤ functions of uniformly bounded variation. If the set of real-valued payo¤ functions C consists of all the functions of uniformly bounded variation de…ned on R, then K is sequentially compact. 2) Some particular monotone functions (Fuchino Plewik 1999) . For linearly ordered sets X and Y , if Y is sequentially compact with density 12 less than the splitting number s 13 , then the set of monotone functions from X to Y is sequential compact. Thus, if C consists of all the monotone functions from X to Y , then K is sequentially compact.
Remark 7 K can be set to be a closed subset or subspace of a vector space. For instance, if all the elements in the collections of measures P(A) are absolutely continuous with respect to some …nite (probability) measure on ( ; B( )), denoted P(A) << ; K with all the elements being real-valued is actually a closed subset of L 1 ( ; ); since each f in K is integrable.
Sequential Continuity of Expected Utility
The critical step for existence is to prove the Sequential Continuity of Expected Utility functions. We will utilize the famous Delbaen's Lemma (Delbaen 1974) here.
Proposition 2 (Sequential Continuity of Expected Utility) U and V are sequentially continuous, that is, for any sequence f(f n ; a n )g n = f(f n ; a 0;n ; a 1;n )g n in K A with f n ! f 0 2 K pointwise and a n ! a 0 = (a 0 0 ; a 0 1 ) 2 A under the product metric on A, U (f n ; a n ) ! U (f 0 ; a 0 ) and V (f n ; a n ) ! V (f 0 ; a 0 )
Proof. First, consider the function V ( ; ). for all ! 2 .
3) Now given any sequence f(f n ; a n )g n in K A with f n ! f 0 2 K pointwise and a n = (a 0;n ; a 1;n ) ! g n and g are obviously uniformly bounded. Without loss of generality, we can rescale the bound to 1 for simplicity. It will not change the …nal result of Delbaen's Lemma anyway.
4) Note that P(A) is a collection of Borel probability measures. Let p n ( ) : = p( ; a 0;n ; a 1;n ) 2 P(A)
Since p(Ej ; ) is continuous on A;for closed E ; p n (E) = p(E; a 0;n ; a 1;n ) ! p(E; a Then let n = m ! 1; we complete the proof of this claim. Hence
In sum, the result for V ( ; ) follows from Delbaen's Lemma (1974). The proof for U ( ; ) is similar. Just note that U (f; a) = U 1 (f; a) U 2 (f; a);where
One can place similar argument respectively on U 1 (f; a) and U 2 (f; a): It is easy to show both of them are sequentially continuous and therefore U is too.
Sequential closeness of constraint set
One can easily …nd a corollary of Maximum Theorem of Berge (Aliprantis Border 2006, Theorem 17.31) by replacing nets by sequences in the proof. We make it a lemma with sequential characterization as below: f (x; y): Then 1) m is sequentially continuous. 2) If Y is Hausdor¤ , has a sequentially closed graph (i.e. for any sequence f(x n ; y n )g n in Gr with (x n ; y n ) ! (x 0 ; y 0 ), if y n 2 (x n ) for all n, then y 0 2 (x 0 )). exists. Also, the best response correspondence A has a sequentially closed graph.
Lemma 3
A : K A has a sequentially closed graph (i.e. for any sequence f(f n ; a 0;n ; a 1;n )g n in K A with f n ! f 0 2 K pointwise on A 0 and (a 0;n ; a 1;n ) ! (a Proof. Given the sequential continuity of V ( ; ) on K A, lemma 3.4. implies that the correspondence A is sequentially closed. Second recall that the participation-guarantee contract set
It is sequentially closed.
Lemma 4 K(r) is sequentially closed on K.
Proof. Given the sequential continuity of V ( ; ) on K A, lemma 3.4. implies that V (f ) is sequentially continuous in f: Thus, for any sequence ff n g n K(r) with f n ! f 0 pointwise on A 0 ; V (f n ) r; for each n:( ) And, by sequential continuity of V ; lim n!1 V (f n ) = V (f 0 ): Then, take limit on both side of ( ); we
Hence, f 0 2 K(r): This completes the proof.
Recall that the constraint set of the principal's problem
:Based on the preceding lemmas, now we can have such a proposition about Gr r A as below:
Proposition 3 Gr r A is nonempty and sequentially closed.
Proof. First, we know A (f ) 6 = ;for each f 2 K and K(r) 6 = : So Gr r A 6 = : Second, we know K(r) is sequentially closed on K and A is sequentially closed too. Claim: As the graph of A restricted to K(r); Gr r A is sequentially closed. For any sequence f(f n ; a 0;n ; a 1;n )g in Gr r A s.t. (f n ; a 0;n ; a 1;n ) ! (f 0 ; a 0 0 ; a 0 1 ); (a 0;n ; a 1;n ) 2 A (f n ) and f n 2 K(r):Since K(r) is sequentially closed, f n ! f 0 2 K(r): Since A is sequentially closed,
Thus, (f 0 ; a 0 ) 2 Gr r A : This completes the proof of this claim.
Existence of optimal solution
Now we are ready to prove the existence result. Let us …rst see a lemma indicating that the expect utility of the principal on the constraint set will be upper bounded.
Proof. Let U = sup (f;a0;a1)2GrrA U (f; a 0 ; a 1 ). we know U (f; a 0 ; a 1 ) is sequentially continuous and K A is sequentially compact. Then the range of U is sequentially compact, which is preserved by sequential continuity. Note the codomain of U (f; a 0 ; a 1 ) is R;a metric space. So the range of U is compact. By Heine-Borel Theorem, it is bounded and closed in R:Therefore U is …nite. Now we integrate all the previous results in hand to prove the existence of optimal solutions to this generalized moral hazard problem.
Theorem 1 There exists an optimal contract-actions pair, (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) solving the principal-agent problem (P1).
Proof. We know U = sup (f;a0;a1)2GrrA U (f; a 0 ; a 1 ) is …nite. By the de…nition of supermum, there is a sequence f(f n ; a 0;n ; a 1;n )g n in Gr r A with U (f n ; a 0;n ; a 1;n ) ! U .
Given the sequential compactness of K and the compactness of A, there is a subsequence f(f n k ; a 0;n k ; a 1;n k )g k in Gr r A and a pair (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) in K A such that f n k ! f pointwise on and (a 0;n k ; a 1;n k ) ! (a 0 ; a 1 ) under the metric on A.
Since Gr r A is sequentially closed, (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 Gr r A . Since U ( ; ) is sequentially continuous,
If all the elements in the collections of measures P(A) are absolutely continuous with respect to some …nite (probability) measure on ( ; B( )), denoted P(A) << ; we can modify the element of M to be (B(A 0 ) B( ); B(D))-measurable and continuous in a 0 for almost every ! with respect to . One can easily …nd it will not change the result of existence shown as above. It implies that the contract can be allowed to be discontinuous in a 0 for a null set of !: If is Lebesgue measure, the contract can be discontinuous in a 0 with respect to countably many ! 0 s : We can give an existence result under a weaker assumption of contract space as below.
Theorem 2 If P(A)
<< and M is re-de…ned to be M := ff : A 0 ! Dj(B(A 0 ) B( ); B(D))-measurable and continuous in a 0 for almost every ! with respect to g; there exists an optimal contractactions pair, (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) solving the principal-agent problem (P1).
Example 19
According to the famous Gantt wage payment system in industrial management, which is a kind of combination of time-rate wage and piece-rate wage, on countable ! 0 s; f could be step functions in a 0 . When the output is below a standard, time rate is applied; When the output is at the standard, there is a bonus of 20% of the normal time rate; When the output is above the standard, piece rate is applied. f is discontinuous in a 0 only at the standard point. e.g. suppose = [0; z]; A = [0; 1] [0; 1]:
Hence, by theorem 2, as long as the rest assumptions are satis…ed, there will exist at least one optimal Gantt payment scheme f :
Value of observable actions
Many facts implies that it may be valuable for people to make observable actions contractible given observable actions are entailed in delegation. For instance, H. L. Gantt (1919) identi…ed that "to the Bethlehem Steel works, the average monthly output of the shop from March 1, 1900, to March 1, 1901, was 1,173,000 pounds, and from March 1, 1901, to August 1, 1901 [having implemented the task and bonus system] it was 2,069,000 pounds." By the way, "the shop had 700 men in it and we were paying on the bonus plan only about 80 workmen out of the entire 700." F. Kenneth Iverson, former CEO of the steelmaker Nucor, also combinated base hourly wage (about $8) system with bonuses related to productivity. He gained success and greatly raised productivity. From the formulation of this principal-agent problem, one may already notice that the observable actions a 0 a¤ect the outcomes through two major channels: 1) a 0 a¤ects outcomes via its direct e¤ect on the parameterized probability distribution p( ja 0 ; a 1 ); i:e:for each E 2 B( ); p(Ej ; a 1 ) is a function of a 0 : 2) a 0 contains partial information about hidden actions a 1 . It is because there would be an interdependence between a 0 and a 1 embodied in the agent's best response and thereby the principal's constraint set. So the inclusion of observable actions will lead to a structural change in the principalagent problem and implies that it could be worthwhile to include observable actions as contingencies in the contracts. Anyhow, we are just highly interested in the reason why the principal should write the contract also on observable actions. Based on the existence of optimal solutions to this principal-agent problem, we can show some further comparative conclusions as follows.
Equivalence of two types of problems
To compare the case of the contracts based on both a 0 and ! with that of the contracts based only on !; we just need to compare our previous optimization problem (P1) with the optimization problem (P2) in which a 0 is not contracted on as below:
where G is a sequentially closed subset of fg : ! Djg is (B ( ); B(D) ) measurableg for the topology of pointwise convergence; which is sequentially compact 14 :c 0 : ! R is the continuous cost(disutility) function of observing merely outcomes. When it is costless to observe observable actions, c 0 (!) = c(a 0 ; !);for each (!; a 0 ): Now we de…ne a projection function ! : (a 0 ; !) 7 ! !: Thus we can …nd a new constraint set
Intuitively, any contract in K G only depends on !; although it is still a function of both a 0 and ! in formality.
Proposition 4 K G and G are equivalent, i.e. they can be put in 1-1 correspondence (1-1 and onto) or have same cardinal number.
Easy to see that ' is an well-de…ned 1-1 correspondence.
Proposition 5 K G is a sequentially closed subset of K (and M) under the topology of pointwise convergence.
Proof. It can easily be followed by the fact that G is a sequentially closed subset of fg : ! Djg is (B( ); B(D)) measurableg for the topology of pointwise convergence.
Moreover, we can consider a new optimization problem (P3): max
where
Easy to see that P2 and P3 will achieve the identical maxima and optimal actions (a 0 ; a 1 ) and 1-1 corresponded optimal contract functions (f and g ) by the two preceding claims. In this sense, we can view P2 and P3 as equivalent problems. Thus, we can convert P2 to P3 and instead compare P1 with P3 to analyze the value of information about observable actions.
Weak Dominance result with costlessly observable actions
We will see that the optimal contracts based on both a 0 and ! will always weakly dominate the optimal contracts based merely on ! as long as it is costless to observe a 0 : It is just because P1 has a larger constraint set containing that of P3 and they have an identical objective funtion. This is formulated in the theorem below. First we will see a lemma that checks the e¤ect of the change in contract structure on the constraint set.
Lemma 6
Thus, (f; a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 Gr r A :Furthermore, Gr r A Gr r A : Provided the extended constraint set, it is bene…cial to include a 0 in the contracts as long as the observation cost allows.
Theorem 3
If assumptions A1-A7 hold and c 0 (!) = c(a 0 ; !);for each !; a 0 , the optimal solution including a 0 in contracts will bring to the principal at least as high as utility that ignoring a 0 in contracts:
Proof. This result simply follows by the preceding lemma. Since Gr r A Gr r A ; max U (f; a 0 ; a 1 )
Remark 8
In this case, if the participation constraint is always binding, the optimal contract including (a 0 ; !) as the contingencies will weakly Pareto dominate the optimal contract including ! as the contingency.
We know that observable actions contain more information about the agent's real contribution in delegation. Addressing the impact of observable actions on the structure of this principal-agent problem, the new contract structure by including observable actions as additional contingencies could suggest an improvement of the solution to the principal-agent problem. By the preceding proof, we can observe that including observable actions as additional contingencies in the contracts in fact enriches the constraint sets suggested by incentive compatibility and voluntary participation. It o¤ers more possibilities for the principal to consider in optimizing his objective. However, we ignore the additional cost of observing observable actions so far. With the consideration of that, the principal has to compare its bene…t and its cost on the margin to make a decision. Gnatt (1919) wants to encourage supervisors to coach employees rather than drive them to perform. Productivity doubled in some organizations after management instituted this pay system, reinforcing Gantt's belief that humanitarian management was the key to achieving organizational goals. We can utilize the language of agency theory to translate this statement. The observable action, work time, does exist to a¤ect the agent's welfare 15 and is related to productivity somehow. There is a guaranteed time wage for every worker in Gnatt's task and bonus payment plan. This embodies so called "humanitarian management". On the other hand, It would also be more likely for the principal to induce the agent to select more desirable actions in the principal's interest 16 , since the feasible contracts with the inclusion of observable actions would generally induce a richer best response action set by the correspondence A : Therefore, it is more likely for the principal to attain a higher welfare by a more appropriate contractactions bundle and the "humanitarian management" is eventually bene…cial to supervisors. This point can be generalized in the generic contract design with the inclusion of observable actions.
A su¢ cient condition for strong dominance result with costlessly observable actions
People may also be interested in strong dominance result with costless observable actions, that is, when the principal's welfare in the present of the hybrid contracts is strictly better than that from straight outcome-contingent contracts. Due to the complicated form of contracts, it is not easy to …nd a su¢ cient and necessary condition for strong dominance here. Fortunately, by utilizing lattice theory we can still provide a su¢ cient condition for this issue. Let us see some de…nitions …rst.
De…nition 1 On ( ; B( )) with being a subset of Euclidean space, a probability measure P is strictly …rst-order stochastically dominated by another probability measure
De…nition 2 Given is a partially-ordered set, parameterized probability measure p( ; ) is strictly …rst-order increasing in if p( ; ) is strictly stochastically dominated by p( ; 0 ), for any < 0 in :
Assume that D is a subset of Euclidean space. We call f 2 K has an almost positive(negative) pertubation f 2 K if there exists some f 2 K such that for almost every ! and each a 0 f (a 0 ; !) = f (a 0 ; !) and otherwise f (a 0 ; !) > f (a 0 ; !):
Referring to Edlin and Shannon (1998) Theorem 3 for strictly monotone comparative statics, we can provide a series of desirable conditions: Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumptions A1-A7 hold. Also , A and D are compact rectangles in Euclidean spaces 17 .
) is supermodular and di¤ erentiable in (a 0 ; a 1 ) for each f 2 K; V has strictly increasing di¤ erences in (f ; (a 0 ; a 1 )); @V @a1;i is strictly increasing in f for some i; where a 1;i denotes the i-th coordinate of a 1 ;
2) For any solution to P3, (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ); (a 0 ; a 1 ) is the interior solution to 3) P(A) << ; there exists a nonempty proper subset E of such that (E) = 0; 1 6 We will discuss more details in section 4.3. 1 7 So they are all complete lattices.
4) f has an almost positive pertubation f 2 KnK G ; 5) p( ; a 0 ; a 1 ) is strictly …rst-order increasing in (a 0 ; a 1 ):u( ; f (a 0 ; )) is strictly increasing in !; then max
Proof. For each (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) solving P3, hypothesis 3 and the de…nition of almost positive pertubation imply that there exists some f 2 KnK G such that f (a 0 ; !) = f (a 0 ; !) for almost every ! and each a 0 and f (a 0 ; !) > f (a 0 ; !) otherwise:Clearly f > f :
For each (a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 A (f ), by hypotheses 1), 2) and Edlin and Shannon's strict monotonicity theorem, (a 0 ; a 1 ) > (a 0 ; a 1 ):
Moreover, since f > f ; by hypothesis 3) and the de…nition of f ,
Therefore, (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) 2 Gr r A nGr r A : Next, by hypothesis 4),
Remark 9 One can refer to lattice programming literature (Milgrom Shannon 1994, Topkis 1998, Edlin and Shannon 1998)for relevant concepts, e.g. supermodularity, increasing di¤ erence, etc.
Remark 10 Hypothesis 1) generally claims a certain complementarity between choice variables (a 0 ; a 1 ) and between choice variables and parameter(f ) in the agent's expected utility function. If the probability measure p( ; a 0 ; a 1 ) has corresponding density h(x; a 0 ; a 1 ); Those conditions on V can be transplanted onto H(f; a 0 ; a 1 ) = v(f (a 0 ; !); a 0 ; a 1 )h(x; a 0 ; a 1 ). Hypothesis 2) means that the agent's problem has well-behaved interior solutions. Hypothesis 3) suggests that parameterized beliefs are dominated by a certain probability measure with at least one nonempty 0-measure set. Hypothesis 4 says that one can …nd a positive "pertubation" of the Hypothesis 5) indicates that higher actions can raise the likelihood of obtaining more desirable outcomes to the principal. An example for 7) could be the case in which ! is one-dimensional output and f is just R-valued royalty scheme. If u(!; f (a 0 ; !)) = u(! f (a 0 ; !)) and u is strictly increasing; ! 7 ! u(! f (a 0 ; !)) will be strictly increasing in !:
Moreover, we can propose a more concise hypothesis 4') K G int(K), to replace hypothesis 4). Its proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 7
Assume that D is a subset of Euclidean space. If K G int(K) and there is a measure de…ned on ( ; B( )) such that (E) = 0 for some nonempty proper subset E of , then each e f 2 K G has an almost positive(negative) pertubation f 2 KnK G .
Remark 11 Hypothesis 4') suggests that K embraces K G in an "all-sided" sense. Consider an immediate example. Let D be a closed interval on R:Let K = ff 2 Mjf is continous and 0 f bg:De…ne G= fg 2 M g jg is continous and 0 g ag. Let b > a: Its possible reason is that the principal knows that the only signal-based contracts may lose e¢ ciency relative to the hybrid contracts. As a kind of o¤ set, he may set smaller upper bound for using signal-based contracts. In this case, it is not hard to …nd that
Example 20 I'm considering adding an example to illustrate the strong dominance. But it could be hard. Maybe banking regulation: for the commercial banks, the regulator can write regulatory contracts not only on some signals but also on the bank's observable action -loan.
Extra incentive from the inclusion of costlessly observable actions in contracts
Let us still temporally ignore monitoring cost here. The essence of the incentive induced by a given contract is how much this contract will guide the agent to act in the interest of the principal. Simultaneously, a given contract may also convey the information about the risk-bearing between the principal and the agent, since a given contract will induce the agent's best response actions which will determine the probability distribution of the outcomes. Thus, when the principal designs an optimal contract for moral hazard problems, he is actually choosing the best combination of incentive and risk sharing embodied in the contract. To see this point more clearly, let us …rst show that the generalized moral hazard problem is equivalent to an iterated maximization problem.
U (f; a 0 ; a 1 ) = max (f;a0;a1)2GrrA
U (f; a 0 ; a 1 );
Proof. See the appendix. Now we can see that the original problem has been decomposed into two steps. First, for each contract f; the principal solves max (a0;a1)2A (f ) R u(!; f (a 0 ; !))p(d!ja 0 ; a 1 ): Then he will know the best welfare response to any given contract suggesting a combination of corresponding incentive level and risk bearing level. Second, with the consideration of attracting the agent to participate, the principal will pick a best combination of incentive and risk sharing in his interest by picking the optimal contracts. In other words, optimal contracts represent the highest level of incentive that the principal can achieve provided that the agent's voluntary participation can be guaranteed Although the risk-bearing level carried by a given contract is di¢ cult to clearly de…ne in the generic form of the model, we can still explicitly de…ne the incentive induced by a give contract. We formally de…ne the principal's best welfare response …rst:
De…nition 4 The principal's best welfare response I : K ! R to a contract f is de…ned by
Not hard to verify that I is a well-de…ned function. I(f ) represents the highest possible utility that the principal can obtain by the agent's best response actions to a given contract. It also measures the incentive level induced by f in the spirit of the essence of incentive and the perspective of iterated maximization problem.
Given any two contracts f; f 0 2 K, f induces no less incentive than f 0 if
It means that through the agent's best response di¤erent contracts will induce di¤erent action sets and such di¤erent action sets will lead to di¤erent welfare to the principal by his recommendation. The contract that results in higher welfare to the principal contains higher incentive.
Furthermore, we will easily see that the optimal contracts with the inclusion of observable actions will provide (weakly) higher incentive than those without the inclusion. It is just because that the new contract structure induces the agent to select more desirable actions in the principal's interest and curb the agent's opportunist tendency.
Proposition 9 For any (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) solving P1 and any (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) solving P3, f always induces no less incentive than f : If (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) strictly dominates (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ); f always induces higher incentive than f :
Proof. We know Z u(!; f (a 0 ; !))p(d!; a 0 ; a 1 ) = max Consequently, the optimal contract with the inclusion of observable actions provides (resp. weakly) higher incentive at the same time when it brings to the principal (resp. weakly) higher welfare. So although it is commonly argued that the outcome-contingent contract is an incentive device whereas the straight observable-action-contingent contract provides no incentives, including observable actions along with the outcomes in the contract may reinforce the incentive in the presence of observable actions in ‡uencing the agent's welfare. The inclusion of observable actions in the contract may improve the incentive device provided by straight outcome-contingent contracts. Plus, such an incentive is realizable as it complies with individual participation constraint and also corresponds to an optimal risk sharing between the two parties. It is consistent with the optimal solutions to the moral hazard problem. where (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) solves P1 and (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) solves P3.
Costly observable actions
The l.h.s. denotes the marginal bene…t if the principle uses (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) instead of (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ); whereas the r.h.s. denotes the corresponding marginal cost. We can also de…ne as the informative su¢ ciency of outcomes with respect to observable actions by using (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ) instead of (f ; a 0 ; a 1 ). It's a counterpart of marginal bene…t of the inclusion of observable actions in the contracts. The larger s is, the more su¢ ciently outcomes can provide information about the agent's real contribution relative to observable actions. So if observable actions cannot provide su¢ ciently much additional information, the principal may not include it in the contracts given the existence of its observation cost. This result is actually consistent with many instances in real life. Consider many hightech …rms, e.g. Microsoft, Google, etc. They only design the employment contracts for R&D engineers to be based on the project outcomes not also on any observable actions, e.g. work hours. The marginal bene…t of the inclusion of observable actions in the contracts will be less than its marginal cost.
Concluding remarks
We have o¤ered a very general and reasonable framework for moral hazard problem. We arrive at the conclusion of the existence of optimal contracts with the consideration of observable actions and monitoring cost. In addition, one may notice that the existence result will still hold if there are no observable actions in the problem. So we are indeed providing a very general model compatible with the case with moral hazard. Also, our model may have a broad range of applications, e.g. in optimal insurance design, labor contracts design, public transfer management, etc. Meanwhile, it may be valuable to include observable actions as contingencies in contracts as long as monitoring cost allows, since observable actions do exist and convey valuable information about the real contribution of the agent in delegation. Plus, this inclusion of observable actions will lead to extra incentive.
There might be still some limitations and possible extensions of this paper. The contract takes the form of Caratheodory functions, which may be just a good approximation of real life. It has to be continuous in a 0 ;for each ! or continuous in a 0 for for almost every ! with respect to . The contracts in practice may have more forms than Caratheodory functions. There could be a technical extension of existence result to allow richer contract set. Moreover, the model in this paper focuses on the basic situation of principal-agent relationship: 1) it is an one-shot game rather than repeated or dynamic contracting game; 2) There is only one principal versus one agent. Neither common agency nor multiagents are concerned. 3) Only moral hazard is addressed in this paper. We have not taken into account adverse selection in the contracting games. One may …nd interesting extensions by capturing either point above. One more important thing should be whether we can provide more speci…c empirical work on this issue as well.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 7
For any f 0 2 K G ; since K G int(K); there exists a neighborhood V of f 0 such that V K. Recall K is equipped with the topology of pointwise convergence. The reader can refer to Munkres(2004) . The sets S(x; U ) are a subbasis for this topology. Thus V must be a …nite intersection of subbasis elements S(x; U ) by the de…nition of subbasis, that
S(x i ; U i ); for some m 2 N:
